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Abstract—In modern information systems different information features, about the same individual, are often collected and managed
by autonomous data collection services that may have different privacy policies. Answering many end-users’ legitimate queries requires
the integration of data from multiple such services. However, data integration is often hindered by the lack of a trusted entity, often
called a mediator, with which the services can share their data and delegate the enforcement of their privacy policies. In this paper, we
propose a flexible privacy-preserving data integration approach for answering data integration queries without the need for a trusted
mediator. In our approach, services are allowed to enforce their privacy policies locally. The mediator is considered to be untrusted,
and only has access to encrypted information to allow it to link data subjects across the different services. Services, by virtue of a new
privacy requirement, dubbed k-Protection, limiting privacy leaks, cannot infer information about the data held by each other. End-users,
in turn, have access to privacy-sanitized data only. We evaluated our approach using an example and a real dataset from the
healthcare application domain. The results are promising from both the privacy preservation and the performance perspectives.
Index Terms—Web privacy, Web services, Service composition, Privacy-preserving Web data integration.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
DATA integration is the problem of bridging together acollection of data sources so that they can be queried
as if they were parts of a single database. Despite intensive
research works devoted to that problem over the last few
decades [1], [2], developing a data integration system re-
mains a challenging task. Data privacy, where the privacy
of data subjects in one data source should be protected vis-
a-vis other sources and the integration system as a whole,
is among the key challenges involved in building a data
integration system [3], [4].
Most of existing multi-source data integration solutions
are built as data warehouses where data is periodically
collected from individual data sources and stored within
a central data warehouse. Privacy is often approached by
signing privacy agreements between data sources and the
warehouse to specify who can access the data and for
what purposes. However, such privacy agreements do not
provide guarantees to individual data sources that their
data would not be misused by the warehouse or any other
stakeholder involved in the data integration system
In this paper, we explore an alternative multi-source data
integration approach that gives data providers the control
on their data while answering data integration queries and
reduces the ability of the integration system to misuse
data. We illustrate the research challenges addressed in this
paper through a real-world example from the healthcare
application domain.
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1.1 Motivating Example
Data integration has important applications in the health-
care domain such as building the patient medical record
and detecting the side effects of medications. Assume for
example a data integration system with an access to the
data services1 in Figure 1-a, which in turn have access to the
sample tables in Figure 1-c. Assume we need to investigate
the psychological side-effects of a specific ingredient of HIV
medicines on female patients. Our sample data services
can be composed as in Figure 1-b to achieve our objec-
tive. Specifically, DS1 is invoked with the desired city
to retrieve the identifiers (e.g. the social security numbers
ssn) of HIV patients. Then, DS2, which is provided by psy-
chiatric hospitals, is invoked with obtained ssn numbers
to retrieve the psychiatric disorders for which the patients
have received some treatments for, if any. Then, for each
HIV patient that has developed a psychiatric disorder, DS3
and DS4 are invoked in parallel to retrieve their age, sex
and HIV medications, respectively. Consequently,DS5 is
invoked to retrieve the quantity of the ingredient studied in
each retrieved HIV medications. Then, the outputs of DS3
and DS5 are joined on ssn.
The execution of the data integration plan (or also the
service composition plan2) in Figure 1-b involves a chal-
lenging dilemma. That is, if individual services were to
apply locally their privacy policies, and privacy-sanitize
their output data then the plan cannot be executed. Note
that in such case the social security number ssn, which is
used by the integration plan to link the different information
features of the same patient, will not be disclosed by any of
the services, as it is a personally identifiable information. On
the other hand, if services share their output data with the
1. It is a common practice in the healthcare domain to provide a
service-oriented access to heterogeneous data sources [5]. This class of
services is known as data sharing services [3] or simply data services [6].
2. We use the terms ”service composition plan” and ”data integration
plan” interchangeably throughout the paper.
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*
*
The input of a service can be kept by the integration 
plan and joined with its corresponding outputs.  
Fig. 1. (a) The data services of the running example; (b) A data integration plan; (c) Sample of the data accessed by the services.
integration system without any protection, then they may
infer information about the data held by each other. For
example, the provider of DS2 may infer that his patients
p15, p201 and p512 (refer to table T2 in Figure 1-c) are
also AIDS patients if were provided with an access to the
integration plan3. He needs just to observe the inputs with
which DS2 is queried. Providers of DS3 and DS4 may also
infer that those same patients have psychiatric disorders
and AIDS. Moreover, the integration system (i.e. the entity
responsible of coordinating the execution of the integration
plan), as well as the end-user (i.e. the stakeholder studying
the side-effects of AIDS medications) will learn the diseases,
medications and ages of all patients transmitted by the
services.
A naive solution to avoid information leakage among
involved services would be by getting each of the services
3. This is a reasonable assumption since data providers may require
to be informed how their data is exploited, by which entities and for
what purposes. Often, this is defined in agreed upon privacy polices.
to ship a copy of its underlying data sources to a centralized
data integration system, which can store received copies
and answer queries locally. However, such solution has
several drawbacks that make it impractical for real-world
applications. For example, in application domains where
the data is dynamic, i.e. updated frequently on the data
provider side, the results computed using the copies in the
centralized system may not include the latest updates on
the providers’ sides, which is crucial in critical domains
such as the healthcare, where an incomplete or an erro-
neous query answer might have dramatic consequences
on the patient’s life. Moreover, such a centralized system
may quickly become a target of choice for attackers due to
the data concentration effect involved in retrieving copies
from multiple data sources. Furthermore, current privacy
regulations may prevent data providers from shipping the
data they collect to a third-party which makes the solution
undoable in practice.
In this paper, we propose a practical solution to allow
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the execution of multi-source data integration plans with-
out leaking information about data subjects4 to involved
stakeholders. That is, data services can not infer information
about the data held by each other. Our solution can be used
with trusted and semi-trusted (i.e. semi-honest) mediators.
In the case of semi-trusted mediators, our solution enables
involved data services to locally enforce their security and
privacy policies (that relate to end-users), as the mediator
cannot be trusted to enforce such policies. The solution still
allows the mediator to join data subjects across the different
services without leaking data from one service to another
or to the mediator. In the case of trusted mediators, services
can delegate the enforcement of their security and privacy
policies to the mediator. The solution should just prevent
data leakage among services.
1.2 Existing Solutions
Existing solutions for privacy-preserving data integration
can be classified into three areas: privacy-preserving data
publishing, secure multi-party query computation and trusted
mediators based data integration. We discuss below their limi-
tations based on our running example.
Privacy-preserving data publishing: Privacy models, such
as k-Anonymity [7] and its variations l-Diversity [8] and t-
Closeness [9] compute an anonymized view of a private table
that can be shared with data consumers without the risk of
disclosing the identity of specific data subjects (e.g. patients)
in that view. Some recent works [10], [11] have attempted to
apply the k-Anonymity concept (and its variations) in dis-
tributed settings where the anonymized view is computed
using multiple private tables managed by autonomous data
providers.
However, while k-Anonymity and its variations pro-
vide good privacy guarantees when the private table is
owned by a single data provider, its implementations in
distributed settings compromise the privacy of data subjects
by leaking their private information to data providers while
the latter compute the anonymized view. For example, all
of the works [10], [11] assume that data providers, while
computing the anonymized view, can know the list of data
subjects they have in common5, but none of them should
know the specific attributes’ values that are held by each
other, beyond what is included in the computed view. In
our example, this means that the provider of DS2 can learn
that the patients p15, p201 and p512 are also managed by
the provider of DS1 which is an HIV center, thus inferring
that these patients have AIDS, thus violating their privacy.
Furthermore, such solutions are not convenient for data
integration scenarios where data at the data providers’ side
is dynamic.
Secure Multi-party Computation SMC: SMC protocols al-
low two or more parties to evaluate a function over their
private data, while revealing only the answer and nothing
else about each party’s data. Initial solutions in this research
4. The term data subject refers to the person whose data is collected
and managed by data services (e.g. patients).
5. Data providers in these works exchange the identifiers of data
subjects in clear while they cooperatively compute the anonymized
view.
area involved substantial computation costs that made them
impractical [12]. Several new solutions with an improved
efficiency have emerged over the last few years [13], [14].
However, the efficiency improvements come at an expensive
cost, most of the new solutions such [13] require expensive
(parallel) computation architectures that can be afforded by
big corporations only. In addition, a recent evaluation study
of the new solutions’ efficiency [15] suggests that they can
be applied to non-critical applications only, where end-users
can accept delayed answers.
Trusted mediators based data integration: Solutions in this
category, such as [16], [17], rely on a centralized entity
that can be trusted by all data providers to compute data
integration queries. For example, Yau et al. [16] present a
privacy-preserving data repository that can collect, from
each data provider, only the data necessary to compute
the answer of a query. The data collected is hashed in the
repository in such a way to prevent its reuse for computing
other queries. However, while such solutions could be used
when the integrated data is dynamic, they leak privacy
sensitive information to data providers about the data held
by each other.
1.3 Proposed Approach and Contributions
In this paper, we propose a practical multi-source data
integration approach that would preserve the privacy of
data subjects against the different stakeholders involved in
answering a data integration query including data services,
mediator and end-users. Our approach has the particularity
of reducing data leakage among services to a practical
amount that would prevent services from inferring sensitive
information about data subjects. The mediator has access
only to encrypted information to join data subjects across
involved services. The proposed approach can be used for
both trusted and semi-trusted mediators. Our solution can
be exploited in numerous applications where independent
data sources should preserve the confidentiality of their
data including healthcare [5], eGovernment [1], industrial
collaboration scenarios [18], emergency management [19],
[20], data management in smart environments [21], [22],
personal data markets [23], multi sources data analytics [24],
[25], etc.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We define the main privacy requirements for the
service-oriented class of data integration. These re-
quirements consider the different actors involved in
a composition of services answering a query, includ-
ing the constituent services (i.e., data providers), the
mediator (i.e., the composition system) and the end-
users (i.e., data consumers).
• We introduce a new privacy requirement, dubbed
k-Protection, to ensure that there are no data leaks
among services (i.e., data providers) during the
query computation. In a nutshell, when the output
of a service DSi is used by a composition as input
to another service DSj , the k-Protection requirement
protects the output of DSi by preventing DSj from
distinguishing the exact input value from k possible
input values, where k is set byDSi. This would allow
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DSi to reduce the inference capability of DSj (and
the other services in the composition) about its data
below a practical threshold set by DSi itself.
• We propose an approach to evaluate multi-source
queries over autonomous Web data services while
respecting the k-protection requirement. We validate
our approach in the healthcare application domain
by conducting a set of experiments using a real medi-
cal dataset of 1,150,000 records. The results show that
our solution provides a practical privacy protection
with acceptable performance overhead.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we define our privacy requirements with respect
to services, the mediator, and the end-user. In Section 3,
we present our approach for query evaluation. In Section
4, we evaluate the performance of our approach using a
real medical dataset and discuss its applicability to real life
application domains. In Section 5, we compare our approach
with related research works and conclude in Section 6.
2 PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS IN SERVICE COMPO-
SITION
In this section, we identify and discuss the data privacy
requirements with respect to the different actors involved
in a composition of services, including services, end-users
and the mediator (or the composition system).
2.1 Service Composition
In this paper, we assume that data sources are exposed to
the data sharing environment through Web APIs, i.e. Web
services, to provide a standardized interface to data6.
End-users’ queries are resolved by service composition
as follows (Figure 2). Given a query and a set of available
data services, the integration system compares the received
query with the descriptions of available services to select
the relevant ones. Then the integration system rewrites the
query in terms of calls to selected services. The rewriting,
also called a composition, is then executed in such a way
that preserves the data privacy relative to the different actors
involved.
In this paper we will focus on the privacy issues raised
by the execution of a composition. Readers interested in ser-
vice selection and query reformulation in terms of services
are referred to our previous work [26], [27] or to similar
works [28].
In the following we formalize the notion of a com-
position execution plan and define the requirements that
should be satisfied in a privacy-preserving execution of
a composition plan with respect to the different actors
involved, including the mediator, end-users and involved
data sharing services.
Definition 1 (Composition Execution Plan): We adopt the
definition given in [28]. A composition execution plan is a
directed acyclic graph H in which there is a node corresponding
6. The class of Web services that access and query data sources
is known as Data Services or Data Sharing Services [3], [6], [16], and
is motivated by the flexibility, and the interoperability that service
oriented architectures could bring to data integration.
Data Service 
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Query 
Rewriting
Privacy-Preserving 
Plan Evaluation
Query 
Plan
Query Privacy-sanitized result
Removal of 
linkage 
information Mediator 
Data Services 
(Data Providers)
Fig. 2. Privacy-Preserving Service Composition
to each one of the data services involved in answering the query,
and there is a directed edge eij from DSi to DSj if there is
a precedence constraint between DSi and DSj . We say that a
service DSi must preceed DSj if one of its outputs is an input
for DSj .
The composition execution plan of our example is shown
in Figure 1-b. Please note that some nodes are simply
preceded by end-users’ input, e.g. DS1. The query results
can be simply computed by joining the outputs of services
that are leaves in the plan (e.g. DS3 and DS5) [28].
2.2 Data Privacy Requirements
We focus on data privacy in this paper, i.e. the privacy of
data subjects whose data is processed in a composition plan
(e.g. patients in the running example), as opposed to the
privacy of end-users who receive the final result which was
adequately addressed in the literature.
We say that the execution of a composition plan H is
privacy-preserving if it satisfies the following requirements
with respect to the different actors involved including par-
ticipating services, end-users and the mediator:
2.2.1 Requirements with respect to services
The execution of a composition should not leak information
to its constituent services about the data held by each other.
Let <(tx) represents the knowledge that a service DS
holds a given tuple tx. Let tx concerns a data subject x (e.g.
a patient, a product, etc.). Let also <ij(tx) represents the
knowledge leaked form DSi to DSj that DSi holds tx.
When a composition is executed without any privacy
protection, the confidence of DSj ’s provider in <ij(tx) is
Prj(<ij(tx)) = 1. For example, when DS3 in the running
example is invoked with the value ssn = p15, its provider
will learn that both of DS1 and DS2 hold a tuple for the
patient p15, i.e. Pr3(<13(tp15)) = Pr3(<23(tp15)) = 1 (thus
inferring p15 has HIV and mental disorders).
A service DSi can control the leakage of its data by
keeping Prj(<ij(tx)) below an accepted threshold (fixed by
DSi). We define below a mechanism to control data leakage
among services.
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Definition 2 (k-Protection): Given a composition H and a
vector K = {k1, k2, ..., kn}, where ki is a positive integer
determining the protection threshold (i.e. 1/ki) the service DSi
must provide for its output tuples against the other services inH,
then for each edge eij inH, Prj(<ij(tx)) must be≤min(1/kl),
where 1/kl is the protection threshold of DSl, which is, in turn,
a (direct or indirect) parent of DSj in H. Note that DSj has at
least one parent in H (i.e. DSi, kl ≥ ki).
The k-protection mechanism is inspired by the concepts
of k-anonymity [7] and Private Information Retrieval PIR
[29]. Intuitively, this mechanism ensures that when a service
DSj is invoked (with an input data value fromDSi), it must
not be able to precisely determine its input value between
kl other possible input values (where kl ≥ ki). In other
words, instead of invoking DSj with a precise input value
v, DSj should be invoked with a generalized value of v
that matches with a range of values V (v ∈ V ) containing
at least kl other possible values. This way, the certainty (i.e.
the confidence) of DSj that v is held by DSi is less than
1/kl. One possible way to implement this mechanism is to
compute V such that it contains kl values for whichDSj has
an output. Please note that the k-protection is similar to PIR
in that when a service is queried (i.e. invoked) it does not
know exactly the specific query it is executing on its own
dataset.
Example: We continue on our running example. Given the
data accessed by our sample services in Figure 1c, examples
of the privacy breaches if these services were invoked with-
out applying the k-protection mechanism include: DS2 will
know that its patients p15, p201 and p512 have AIDS; DS3
will know that these same patients, in addition to having
AIDS, suffer from severe psychiatric disorders, etc. Now,
assume that k1 = 3, the k-protection mechanism ensures
that DS2 must not be able to distinguish each of its input
values (e.g. p15) from at least 3 other values for which it
has matching tuples in its table T2. Figure 3 shows how
the k-protection is enforced on the edge e12. The value p15
is generalized into a range of values V which contains at
least three values (e.g. p11, p15 and p16) for which DS2 has
matching tuples. After the invocation of DS2, the extrane-
ous tuples are filtered out.
Preserving data privacy against the different data
providers involved in a query has not been addressed ade-
quately in the literature. For example, works on distributed
privacy-preserving data publishing such as [10], [11] have
focused on preserving the data privacy against final end-
users while allowing involved data providers to know the
list of data subjects they have in common. The k-Protection
mechanism complements those works by making them im-
mune to information leakage among data providers.
2.2.2 Requirements with respect to end-users
End-users are the entities that issue a query and receive
the final result of executing the composition answering
the query. Depending on the application considered, end-
users could be trusted or untrusted by data subjects. For
examples, care givers (e.g. primary care doctors, nurses, etc.)
could be trusted to access (all or part of) the medical infor-
mation of their patients for treatment purposes. Researchers
who study the health conditions of a population, could be
only trusted to access to anonymized data that cannot be
linked to any specific patient.
End-users should be only allowed to access the infor-
mation they are entitled to. This can be ensured either by
applying privacy-aware access control policies of individ-
ual services in case of trusted end-users as in [30], or by
anonymizing the results returned by the composition to
prevent the re-identification of data subjects.
2.2.3 Requirements with respect to the mediator
The mediator, i.e. the entity that executes the composition
plan, is another important actor in a composition of services.
It may not be necessarily managed by the final data recipi-
ent. It is responsible for carrying out the intermediary data
operations in the composition plan (e.g. joining the outputs
of different services, tuples selection, etc.).
Mediators could be trusted if managed by a trusted
entity and are untrusted otherwise. An untrusted mediator
should not have access to any Personally Identifiable Infor-
mation PII. For example, the mediator should not be able to
identify any of the patients p15, p201 and p512 whose private
data is circulating throughout the composition plan.
This implies that the data produced by a service should
be protected by the service itself before being released to
the mediator (and used for the invocation of other services).
This can be ensured either by encrypting the released data
(in case of trusted end-users) or by anonymizing it (in case
of untrusted end-users).
Different applications may require different combina-
tions of requirements, i.e. not all requirements should be
respected at the same time. For example, in applications
such as the healthcare, most often only the requirements re-
lated to services and end-users are relevant. In that domain,
data integration is usually carried out by a trusted authority
(e.g., a government agency) to, for example, discover new
medical knowledge. In that case, it is important to protect
data privacy against individual data providers (i.e. services)
and end-users (e.g. researchers), whereas the mediator itself
(i.e., the authority) is trusted. In application domains such
as cybersecurity and terrorist fighting, often the require-
ment related to services is the most relevant. For example,
consider a scenario where the objective is to proactively
identify potential airplane terror attacks before they happen
by identifying risky passengers (e.g., passengers with a
criminal history and suspicious behaviors) on passenger
lists of airline companies. Data providers in such case could
be airline companies, police and intelligence services, banks,
etc. The final end-user is a police inspector and the mediator
is a governmental agency. In such case, the end-user and the
mediator can be trusted, whereas data providers should not
know they have a certain person in common, without a deep
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investigation from the inspector (e.g., an airline company
should not know that one of its passengers has a criminal
history before the case is fully investigated by the inspector).
3 A PRIVACY-PRESERVING QUERY EVALUATION
APPROACH
In this section, we start by presenting our different as-
sumptions and some key concepts. Then, we present an
approach to evaluate multi-source queries while respecting
the requirements discussed above.
3.1 Context and Assumptions
In this work, we made the following assumptions. We
consider a distributed environment with heterogeneous dis-
tribution of data. This means that different services manage
different features of information about the same set of data
subjects. In contrast, in a homogeneous data distribution,
different services manage the same features of information
about different data subjects. The second case is easier to
deal with since there is no real integration to be done.
Therefore we only look at the first case.
We consider a honest but curious environment, where the
stakeholders involved in the execution of a data integration
plan will follow the given protocol. However, they may try
to analyze exchanged data during the protocol execution.
This setting is also known as semi-honest environment in the
literature [31].
We assume that services can provide statistical infor-
mation about their accessed datasets such as the service
selectivity [28]. The selectivity of a data service DS relative
to a range of input values R, denoted as Se(DS,R), is
the number of output values when DS is queried with
R. Let us consider the sample data in T3 (Figure 1-c),
the selectivity of DS3 relative to some ranges is as fol-
lows: Se(DS3, [p0, p1000]) = 13, where the range [p0, p1000]
includes the whole table T3; Se(DS3, [p0, p10]) = 2,
Se(DS3, [p5, p20]) = 3.
3.2 An Overview of the Proposed Approach
In our approach we assume that services, the mediator and
end-users are independent entities. Our approach ensures
the privacy requirements relative to those entities as follows.
In our approach, data services involved in the inte-
gration plan can apply locally their security and privacy
policies on non-identifier attributes. On the other hand,
they are all required to encrypt the identifiers used by the
mediator to join data by an Order Preserving Encryption
Scheme OPES [32]. An OPES encrypts numeric data values
while preserving the order relation between them. With
OPES, we can apply equality and order comparison queries
on encrypted data without decrypting the operands. Doing
so, the mediator gets only access to encrypted values of
identifier attributes and to values that are already protected
by services for non-identifier attributes (e.g., by applying
the desired anonymization techniques). This satisfies the
privacy requirements relative to the mediator. Once the
integration plan has been executed, the mediator removes
encrypted identifier attributes from result. This way, the
final recipient will only have the anonymized data without
Se(DS3, ]-∞,+∞[)
Se=13, mid =c512
Se(DS3, ]-∞,c512])
Se=13, mid =c256
Se(DS3, ]-∞,c256])
Se=10, mid =c128
Se(DS3, ]-∞,c128])
Se=5, mid =c64
Se(DS3, ]-∞,c64])
Se=5, mid =c32
Se(DS3, ]-∞,c32])
Se=5, mid =c16
Se(DS3, ]-∞,c16])
Se=5, mid =c8
Se(DS3, [c8,c16])
Se=2, mid =c4
DS3Mediator
Fig. 4. The communication rounds between the mediator and DS3 to
compute the generalized value.
any individually identifiable information. This satisfies the
privacy requirements relative to end-users.
To satisfy the privacy requirements relative to services,
the mediator applies our k-Protection mechanism by gener-
alizing the encrypted identifiers’ values before using them
to invoke the services. If a data service DSi was to be
invoked with a value x (originating from a parent service
DSj) and it is required the certainty of DSi that x is held by
DSj to be less than 1/k, then x is generalized through our
protocol (presented in the following) to match with, at least,
k tuples in DSi. The value generalization is carried out by
the mediator in collaboration with the service to be invoked.
Privacy requirements relative to end-users and the me-
diator are conventional requirements and have been exten-
sively studied in the literature. For example, the services can
use any of the anonymization algorithms that implement
the k-Anonymity and its variations [7], [8], [9] to locally
anonymize their data. Privacy requirements with regard
to services are, to the best of our knowledge, new, i.e.,
information leakage among data providers have not been
property addressed in the literature. Therefore, in the fol-
lowing sections we focus on ensuring the k-Protection by
presenting a practical protocol for generalizing encrypted
identifier values.
The anonymization applied by the individual data ser-
vices (and its utility) is out of the scope of this paper.
However, it is worth to mention that the anonymization
can be realized by the services either in isolation by directly
applying one of the algorithms [7], [8], [9], or cooperatively
by extending one of the algorithms [10], [11] with our k-
Protection mechanism presented in the next section.
3.3 Generalization of Encrypted Identifier Values
The objective of the generalization protocol can be formu-
lated as follows: given an encrypted identifier value x (x ∈ X)
with which a service DSi should be invoked, allow the mediator
to compute a generalized value7 x′ of x such that x′ matches
7. We assume that data services provide different operations (i.e.,
functions) allowing to query the underlying datasets by precise or
generalized values (e.g., intervals).
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with, at least, k possible values held by DSi where k is maximum
protection factor required by the parents of DSi in H. Note that
the mediator cannot decrypt x to generalize it alone. Rather,
it needs to collaborate with the services to be invoked to
carry out the generalization.
We first describe two naive approaches to generalize
the identifier values and analyze their limitations. Then,
we build on our analysis to define a hybrid approach that
addresses the identified limitations.
3.3.1 Domain-based identifier generalization
A naive approach to compute x′ is to exploit the domain
of the attribute x (i.e., X). The idea here is to use X as a
starting value of x′ then to gradually increase its precision
by removing parts of X until it is not possible to remove
any part without violating the k-Protection requirement.
For this purpose, the mediator determines for each data
service DSi the protection factor k that must be respected: k
= MAX(DSj .kj), where DSj represents the parents of DSi
in H. Then, for each input tuple t, the mediator determines
the minimum range of values R [a, b] that should be used
to invoke DSi instead of t.x. To this end, the mediator
queries the selectivity ofDSi with respect to a wide range of
identifier valuesR (we use the range ]-∞, +∞[ to denote the
range covering all the tuples managed by DSi) along with
a value mid occurring in the middle of the domain X . Then
if the returned selectivity is greater than k, the mediator
compares t.x to mid to determine the half of R covering
t.x. The last step is repeated with the obtained new interval
until there is no interval with a selectivity greater than k.
Then, DSi is invoked with the obtained interval. After the
invocation, the mediator retains only the outputs related to
t.x, i.e., the false-positives are removed by the mediator, as
it knows the original encrypted input value t.x.
Example: Assume that the service DS3 is to be invoked
with the value c15 (i.e., the encrypted value of p15) and
k = 2. Figure 4 shows the messages exchanged between
DS3 and the mediator. For simplicity, the example assumes
that |X|=1024. First, the mediator queries the selectivity of
DS3 relative to a wide range of values (denoted by ]-∞,
+∞[). DS3 replies that it has 13 values and the value c512
is in the middle of X . The mediator compares c15 with
c512 and determine the new range ]-∞, c512]. This step is
repeated until the computed range cannot be divided while
respecting the value of k.
Privacy Analysis: From a privacy perspective the protocol
has the following limitations:
• First, the mediator learns precise information about
X , i.e., it receives the encrypted values of fixed data
points in X (i.e., 12X ,
1
4X ,
1
8X ...etc.). If the mediator
knows the domain X , then it can map the encrypted
values to their original values (since it knows their
positions in X), or at least establish lower and upper
bounds about each encrypted value.
• Second, it may leak additional knowledge to services
by violating the k-Protection requirement. For ex-
ample, if the selectivity of the range [c8, c16] in the
previous example were 1 (instead of 2), then the
mediator would return back to the range ]-∞, c16].
t.x ≤ c199t.x ≥ c199
t.x ≤ c20t.x ≥ c20
R  = ]-∞,+∞[, 
Se =13, 
mid   = c199
R  = ]-∞, c199], 
Se = 7, 
mid   = c20
R  = ]-∞, c20], 
Se =4, 
Fig. 5. Generalizing the value t.x = c15 before invoking DS3.
However, the service DS3 would still know that the
mediator is interested in the range [c8, c16], as it has
tested its selectivity. One would think that |R| could
be returned instead of the selectivity to avoid such
a problem (by making sure that |R| ≥ 2k before
splitting it), however the problem may persist as it
could happen that some values in the new range
are not assigned to any individual, e.g., even though
|[c8, c16]| > k, the values in that range, except for c15,
may not be assigned to patients (i.e., they are still
virgin ssn values), then DS3 will infer that x is c15.
In addition, the protocol is not optimal. For instance,
many of the rounds in Figure 4 (which involve important
communication cost) did not reduce the selectivity, i.e., the
first two ranges have the same selectivity, and the same
applies to the fourth, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh
range.
3.3.2 Dataset-based identifier generalization
A second naive approach to generalize x is to use the
ordered dataset accessed by the service to be invoked,
denoted by SoDSi . In this approach, the mediator queries the
selectivity of DSi with respect to a wide range of identifier
values R (we used the range ]-∞, +∞[ to denote the range
covering SoDSi ) along with a value mid occurring in the
middle of SoDSi . Then, if the returned selectivity is greater
than 2k, the mediator compares t.x to mid to determine
the half of R covering t.x. The last step is repeated with
the obtained new interval until there is no interval with a
selectivity greater than k. Then, DSi is invoked. After the
invocation, the mediator retains only the outputs related to
t.x, i.e., the false-positives are removed by the mediator, as
it knows the original encrypted input value.
Example: We continue with our running example to show
how we ensure the k-protection requirement on the edge
e23. Assume that DS1 and DS2 require a protection factor k
= 3. The invocation of DS2 returns the tuples corresponding
to c15, c201 and c512 where these values are the encrypted
values of p15, p201 and p512. Instead of invoking DS3
directly with the tuple c15, the mediator generalizes c15
as follows (refer to Figure 5). The mediator requests the
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selectivity of DS3 with a range covering all its possibly
managed values (i.e., R = ]-∞, +∞[); DS3 acknowledges
it has 13 distinct values and that the value (mid = c199)
occurs in the middle of these ordered values. The mediator
compares c15 to c199, and determines the new interval R=
]-∞, c199]. It then requests the selectivity of the new R along
with the new mid; the new values of Se and mid are 7 and
c20. It determines again the new interval by comparing c15
to c20. The new interval is R= ]-∞, c20] and its selectivity
is 4. The algorithm stops here as if the new interval was
divided then Se will be less than k.
Privacy Analysis: This protocol does not suffer from the
limitations discussed above. Specifically, it does not release
the encrypted values of data points with known positions
in X . It does not also test the selectivities of ranges that
may contain less than k values, as the protocol verifies that
the selectivity of a range is ≥ 2k before splitting it in two
equal ranges. xThe major limitation of this approach is that
the boundaries of the computed range x′ depend on the
dataset currently held by DSi (i.e., depend on SoDSi ), and
may change if new tuples were inserted in SoDSi , or if some
existing tuples were deleted, as we show in the following
example.
Example: Let us assume that SoDSi = {a, b, c, f}, k = 2, x = c
and the computed x′ is [c, f ]. If the new tuples d and e were
inserted, i.e., SoDSi = {a, b, c, d, e, f}, then x′ would become
x′ = [a, c], and the provider of DSi would be able to infer
that x is c, as [a, c] ∩ [c, f ] = {c}.
3.3.3 Hybrid protocol for identifier generalization
Based on the limitations discussed above, a good data
generalization scheme should satisfy the following criteria.
First, it should guarantee that the generalized value (i.e., the
computed range x′) should always remain the same every
time the composition plan is executed. In other words, the
generalization scheme should be deterministic. Moreover, if
the dataset SoDSi held by a service DSi is changed (because
of data insertions or deletions), then the newly computed
range should be a subset or superset of previously com-
puted ranges for the same value x and with, at least, k
intersecting values. Second, it should not leak additional
information to the mediator that could help the latter to
map the encrypted values to their real ones.
Before describing our proposed scheme for the general-
ization of encrypted data that avoids the discussed limita-
tions, we first discuss two requirements that data services
should satisfy to participate in the scheme. First, services
must timestamp their accessed data. This requirement can
be simply implemented by timestamping new data inser-
tions. That is, when joining the data integration system,
if the dataset accessed by a service is not time-stamped,
the service can timestamp it with the current time, then
timestamp new data insertions when they occur. Second,
the dataset accessed by a data service DSi, denoted as SoDSi ,
should keep track of the values of identifier attributes. That
is, when a tuple inside the dataset must be deleted, the
dataset should keep the value of the identifier attribute and
its timestamp. These two requirements are realistic and can
be easily implemented, as have been discussed in previous
works in data integration such as [33].
We now present our data generalization scheme which
satisfies the criteria discussed above by combining the two
previously discussed data generalization approaches while
avoiding their limitations. Our scheme proceeds along the
following steps.
1) The first step is carried out offline when data ser-
vices join the data integration system. Every DSi
partitions the domain X to m buckets. Services
are free to choose the partitioning criteria and the
number m. For example, a service may choose to
divide X into m buckets with 50 stored values
in each bucket, while another one may choose to
divide X into m buckets with equal absolute length.
2) The mediator executes the dataset based protocol de-
scribed above and narrows down the computed
range R as long as its selectivity is Se ≥ α∗k, where
α is an integer value > 1 selected by the mediator.
As we will see later in our discussion, α guarantees
that there is at least α candidate ranges satisfying
the k-protection requirement in the R computed
so far. We will explain the effect of α later in our
discussion.
3) The service determines the bucket (or the set of
buckets) that covers R and divides them into ranges
that respect the k-Protection requirement. Data ele-
ments in each bucket are organized into candidate
ranges as follows: (i) they are ordered based on their
time-stamps, i.e., data elements with the same time-
stamp have the same order (which is the case for
the initial set of data elements when DSi has joined
the system). (ii) An initial set of candidate ranges
are formed using the data elements with the highest
order. (iii) Subsequent data points are inserted one
after another in the computed ranges and when
the selectivity of a candidate range becomes 2k it
gets split into two candidate ranges (that could also
evolve independently).
4) The computed ranges that intersect with the initial
range R (that is computed in the first step) are sent
to the mediator, which can now select the candidate
range covering x and use it to invoke DSi.
Illustrative Example: Assume that the ordered dataset ac-
cessed by a data service DSi is shown in Figure 6 (part-
a). For simplicity, the figure shows the content of only one
bucket (i.e., Bi). Each tuple in that dataset is time-stamped
(e.g., the tuple a has the time-stamp t3). Assume also that
x = q, k = 2, and α = 5. Assume also that after running the
dataset based protocol (in the second step) the computed range
that satisfies the condition Se(R) ≥ α ∗ k is R =[f , v].
In the third step, the mediator asks DSi to compute the
candidate ranges that cover R. To this end, DSi finds the
buckets that cover R and computes their candidate ranges.
As can be noticed from the dataset in Fig. 6 (part-a), R ⊂ Bi.
Figure 6 (part-b and part-c) shows how the ranges are
computed. First, the service sorts the tuples inside Bi based
on their timestamps (part-b). Then, it starts to consider the
tuples in Bi one by one and divide Bi into ranges with at
least k values. The tuples b, l, q and y are considered first
(they have the same time-stamp t0), which results into two
initial ranges, i.e., R1[loi, l] and R2[l+, hii], where  ≈ 0.
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Fig. 6. (a) a dataset partitioned into buckets; (b) data elements ordered by their time-stamps; (c) the computation of candidate ranges inside buckets.
Then, the tuples d and e are considered (as they have the
same time-stamp t1). The selectivity of R1 becomes 4 (i.e.,
2k), and therefore it is split into two sub ranges R11[loi, d]
and R12[d+, l]. Similarly, when all the remaining tuples are
considered, we have as a result 9 ranges (shown in Fig 6
(part-c).
The range R =[f , v] computed in the second step inter-
sects with seven ranges, i.e., R121, R122, R211, R2121, R2122,
R221 and R222. Since the range R121 intersects partially
with R, it is merged with R122. The same applies to R222,
therefore it is merged withR221. The obtained five candidate
ranges are then sent back to the mediator, which will be
able to select the final range with which the service will be
invoked, i.e., R2122 [p+, s] (q ∈ R2122).
Our proposed protocol is implemented by two algo-
rithms, one is implemented by the mediator for computing
the initial range R≥ α∗k and carrying out the service invo-
cation (Algorithm 1) and one is implemented by the services
for computing the candidate ranges (Algorithm 2), both are
self-described.
Note that the ranges computed inside each bucket are
deterministic, i.e., the protocol results always in the same
ranges whenever the composition plan is executed, as they
are computed using the data insertion order in the dataset
(which is deterministic). The addition of new data elements
to the dataset does not violate the k-Protection requirement,
as it only results in splitting a range into a set of ranges that
intersect with it by at least k elements. For example, when
x = q, if the plan was executed at an instant t where t0 ≤
t ≤ t1 then the service will be invoked with range R2, and
when it is executed at another instant t′ where t2 ≤ t′ ≤
t3, then the computed range will be R21 ⊂ R2. Since R2
and R21 intersect in R21 which has at least k values, i.e. the
k-Protection requirement still holds.
3.3.4 The effect of α on privacy guarantee
We intuitively explain the effect of α through an example.
Consider the following dataset {a, b, c, d, e, f , g} and
assume that x = d and k is 2.
When α = 1, then the range R that is computed in the
second step (of our protocol) could take two different values
[c, d] and [d, e] (because of data changes) with equivalent
probabilities p = 1αk =
1
2 . When the same query is replayed,
the probability of one of these two ranges happening if the
other range has already happened is p2 = 1(αk)2 =
1
4 .
When α = 2, then the range R that is computed in the
second step could take four different values [a, d], [b, e],
[c, f ] and [d, g] with equivalent probabilities p = 1αk =
1
4 .
When the same query is replayed, the probability of [d, g]
happening when [a, d] has already happened (these two
ranges intersect in d ) is p2 = 1(αk)2 =
1
16 . Similarly, when α
= 5, the probability of such privacy breach becomes 1(αk)2
= 1100 , and when α = 10 this probability becomes
2.5
1000 . In
conclusion, practical values of α (e.g., α ≥ 5) cut down the
probability of privacy breaches to an accepted threshold.
The value of α can be computed as follows α =
√
1
p
k , where
p is the threshold of accepted probability.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we present an evaluation study of our
proposed approach, report on its performance and privacy
preserving strength, and discuss some of the key applica-
tions where it can be used.
4.1 Evaluation Setup
To evaluate our approach, we used a real dataset that
was provided to us by the European project PAIRSE [17].
The dataset was created by merging data from seven real
databases of three French hospitals (specialized in psychi-
atry and cardiology). The dataset contained one big table
with roughly 1,150,000 records (for approximately 850,000
patients). The table has the schema R(ssn, disease, dob, sex,
city, physician observations). The ssn values in the pro-
vided table were replaced by synthetic numeric values by
the original healthcare facilities. The same patient may have
different rows in the table corresponding to the different
diseases for which he or she has been treated.
We constructed three tables out of R:
R1(ssn, disease, city), R2(ssn, disease) and R3(ssn,
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Algorithm 1: k-Protection aware Service Invocation 
Inputs: - The data service to be invoked Si($x, ?y),
- The set of input  tuples IN 
Variables & Functions:
- The protection degree k,
- A range of values R [a, b]
- Se(Si, R) : returns the selectivity Se of Si relative to R
- Split(Si, R): returns a value mid such that mid is in the
middle of the ordered values set V for 
which Si has outputs
Begin
k = max (Sj.kj), where Sj is parent of Si
for each tuple t1 in IN
      R  ← ]˗∞, +∞[
      Se ← Se(Si, R)
      v   ← Split(Si, R)
      while  (Se ≥ 2αk)
                 if t1.x ≥ mid
                          a   ←  mid
                 else 
                          b   ←  mid
                 Se ← Se(Si, R)
                 mid   ← Split(Si, R)  
Candidate Ranges M = CandidateRa(R)
Select R (R ϵ M) such that t1.x ϵ R
invoke (Si ($R, ?y))
      for each obtained tuple t2
          if t2.x ≠ t1.x
                  discard t2      
          else 
                add t2 to OUT
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Outputs: - The set of output tuples OUT 
- CandidateRa(R): returns a set of candidate ranges   
inside R
dob, sex). R1 contained only heart patients (with a total
number of 510,000 patients). R2 contained the patients
that have been treated for a mental illness (with a total
number of 403,000 patients). For each of the tables R1, R2
and R3, we constructed eight datasets of various sizes by
randomly selecting patients of the tables. The constructed
datasets have the sizes: 50K, 100K, 150K, 200K, 250K,
300K, 350K, 400K. For each dataset, we developed a data
service to access the dataset. These 24 services have the
following three signatures: DS1(?ssn, ?disease, $city),
DS2($ssn, ?disease), DS3($ssn, ?dob, ?sex), and were
deployed on independent servers (with independent
resources).
In our experiments we used the following composition:
DS1◦DS2◦DS3; DS1 is invoked with a given city name,
then for each obtained patient DS2 is invoked to verify if
the patient has been treated for some mental illness, then
DS3 is invoked with only those who have been treated for
a mental illness to retrieve their age and sex.
We implemented Algorithm 1 in Java and integrated
it into the data integration system in [17]. Figure 7 shows
the modified system, which consists of two main modules:
Algorithm 2: Computing Candidate Ranges 
Inputs: - I: An initial range computed by the mediator,
- k: The protection factor required by the mediator, 
Variables & Functions:
- A: an empty bucket,
- Se(R) : returns the selectivity of R
Begin
for each bucket Bi[lo, hi] such that Bi ∩ R ≠ Φ
      - Order Bi based on time-stamps
      - Initialize M: M ← [lo, hi]
                        A.lo = Bi.lo; A.hi = Bi.hi
      - For each t ϵ Bi (after ordering it)
            - Insert t in A
            - For each R ϵ M
                  - If Se(R) ≥ 2k (after the insertion)
                     - Split R into R1 and R2
                     - Add R1 and R2 to M
                     - Remove R from M
     - For each R  ϵ M
            - Discard R if R ∩ I = Φ
     - Merge the first and the last ranges R0 and Rn with
                    their neighbours (i.e. R0 with R1 and Rn
                                                       with Rn-1)
     - Return M
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
Outputs: - M: a set of candidate ranges,
service composition engine and the composition execution engine.
The first module rewrites end-users queries into composi-
tions of services. The second module executes the compo-
sitions. We modified, as the figure shows, the composition
execution engine to accommodate Algorithm 1. All services
are deployed on GlasFish 3.0 servers and datasets are stored
in MySQL servers. Algorithm 2 is implemented in Java on
the server side and is accessed as a simple operation of
each developed data service (i.e., each service provides an
operation for querying its underlying dataset and a set of
operations for participating in the proposed protocol, e.g.,
operations for computing the candidate ranges, computing
the selectivity of a range, etc.).
We conducted our experiments on machines with
3.2GHz Intel Processor running Windows 7 with 8 GB RAM.
4.2 Performance Evaluation
Assuming n is the number of services in a composition, l is
the average number a service is invoked in a composition
and m is the average size of the datasets accessed by the
services, the complexity of evaluating a query plan is of the
order O(n ∗ l∗ log2( mαk ) ∗ |Bucket|).
We conducted a set of experiments to evaluate the
performance of our privacy-preserving query evaluation
approach using real databases. Specifically, we evaluated the
effects of (i) the protection factor β = α∗k and (ii) the size of
accessed datasets on the composition execution time.
We measured the composition execution time of our
eight compositions; all compositions are identical, except
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Fig. 8. (a) The performance of the proposed approach as the size of datasets and the value of α∗k increase; (b) The effect of the bucket size on
performance; (c) The performance before and after applying the optimizations.
that all services in each composition are accessing datasets
of one of the aforementioned sizes. We set the bucket size
to 10,000 records (i.e., |Bucket| = 10,000) for all services. We
chose three high values for the protection factor β: β1 = 25
(α = 5, k = 5), β2 = 50 (α = 10, k = 5) and β3 = 100 (α = 20,
k = 5). The probabilities of a privacy breach for these values
are: prob1 = 1(β1)2 = 0.0016, prob2 =
1
(β2)2
= 0.0004, prob3 =
1
(β3)2
= 0.0001.
The composition execution time was computed as fol-
lows. R1 contained patients from 47 cities (with an average
of 10,850 patients per city). Therefore, each composition was
executed 100 times with each one of these 47 cities as input.
Then, we computed the average execution time for each
composition (i.e., for each one of the considered dataset
sizes). Figure 8 (a) shows the obtained result together with
the time required to execute the compositions without en-
forcing the k-protection requirement.
The obtained result shows that, for all the considered
dataset sizes, the overhead involved in enforcing the k-
protection requirement does not exceed two orders of mag-
nitude of the time required to execute the composition
without a protection. We view this as reasonable compared
to the cost incurred by private information retrieval and
secure multi-party computation protocols which exceeds
by hundred times the cost of the original query without a
protection. The reader is referred to [15] for discussion about
the practicality of these approaches in real life applications.
The result shows also that increasing the values of the
protection factor β = α∗k only introduces a minimal addi-
tional overhead. This means that services can choose large
values for k (thus providing better privacy protection to
their outputs) and the mediator can choose large values for
α (thus a very small probability of a privacy breach) without
degrading the overall performance.
Figure 8 (b) shows the effect of changing the bucket size
on the overall query evaluation time. Obviously, reducing
the bucket size will reduce also the time required to compute
the candidate ranges, and thus improve the overall perfor-
mance. Please note that services are not required to use a
large bucket size. It can be defined based on the accepted
probability of a privacy breach. For example, if the bucket
size was 2000, the probability of a privacy breach would be
of the order 1(2000)2 = 0.00000025, which is a practical value.
Additionally, the cost incurred in computing the candidate
ranges inside a bucket can be offset altogether by computing
these ranges offline, as we show in the next subsection.
4.3 Discussion
As mentioned earlier, the value of k is selected by each
individual service to limit the inference capability of other
services in the composition/query about the data held by
the service. The parameter α is an integer value (α ≥ 1)
selected by the mediator to reduce the probability of a
privacy breach (due to replay attacks) to a specific threshold.
The higher the factor α∗k, the better the privacy protection.
However, as the results show, the composition execution
time increases also by increasing that factor.
The values of k and α can be tuned to strike a balance
between privacy protection and performance for the con-
sidered application domain. For example, the experiments
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show that if α = 10 and k =5 (α ∗ k = 50), the probability
of inferring that a service holds a specific tuple is 1(α∗k)2 =
1
2500 = 0.0004 (i.e., the same query needs to be replayed at
least 2500 times for that privacy breach to happen), and the
composition execution time remains less than two times the
time needed without any protection. In practice, the values
of k and α are selected such that the factor (α∗k)2 is always
higher than the number of times the same query can be
executed by the same end-user (the system can limit the
number a same query can be executed by the same end-user
within a specific time window).
4.4 Performance Optimization
The performance of our approach can be improved further
by considering the following optimizations:
Optimization 1: Reuse of pre-computed selectivities and
ranges. At the composition execution time, the same service
is likely to be invoked multiple times for different input
values. The ranges and the selectivities that were computed
in previous invocations (within the same composition ex-
ecution occurrence) can be reused, even partially, instead
of re-computing them each time the same service is in-
voked. Table 1 shows, for example, the numbers of patients
returned by DS1 when invoked with the cities “Lyon 2”,
“Lyon 5” and “Lyon 8”, as well as the average number of
the computed selectivities when DS2 is invoked. Without
this optimization, the number of computed selectivities
would be log2(dataset size) = 18.6. The table shows also the
numbers of reused candidate ranges.
TABLE 1
Experimental Results
City # Patients (by DS1) # Computed selectivities # Reused ranges
Lyon 2 13,738 7.3 257
Lyon 5 11,923 8.2 306
Lyon 8 9,736 8.7 119
Optimization 2: Use of user preferences. In real-life scenar-
ios, many data subjects (e.g., patients, citizens, etc.) may
accept to release some of their private data to some recipi-
ents for some legitimate data uses (e.g., conducting medical
research, law enforcement, etc.) without any protection. For
example, the dataset R was provided to us along with
a patient preferences table specifying some of the entities
each patient accepts to disclose his data; nearly 19% of the
patients accepted to share their medical data (including the
ssn) with medical institutions for improving the healthcare
system. In our second optimization, we exploit the prefer-
ences of data subjects to lift the privacy protection when
a data subject consents to data disclosure. For instance, in
our running query the k-protection requirement could be
lifted when DS2 and DS3 are invoked with input values
originating from those patients who accepted to disclose
their data to medical institutions (such as those providing
DS2 and DS3).
Please note that, one would think that invoking a service
with a precise input value x1 (of an individual who accepted
to release her identifier) could invalidate the k-protection for
another input value x2 (of another individual who did not
accept to release her identifier) if x1 happens to be one of the
k possible values that match with the computed generalized
value x′2 (as the service would be able to eliminate one
value of the k possible values matching with x′2). However,
this will not happen in the first place, as the output tuples
corresponding to x1 will be retrieved when the service is
invoked with x′2, and thus there is no need to invoke it
again. That is, lifting the k-protection requirement for those
patients who agreed to release their identifiers has no impact
on the privacy protection provided for those who did not
accept, as long as the services are invoked with input values
of patients who did not agree to release their data before the
ones who did.
Optimization 3: Off-line computation of k-protection
ranges. Services incur an important computation cost when
they divide their buckets (that are relevant to an invocation)
into ranges respecting the k-protection requirement (i.e.,
Step 3 of the proposed hybrid protocol). However, this step
can be carried out offline in an incremental fashion, as they
insert new tuples.
We conducted a set of experiments to evaluate the per-
formance improvement that could result from the optimiza-
tions presented above. Figure 8 (c), shows the obtained
results when (i) none, (ii) only one and (iii) all of the
optimizations is/are applied. The result shows that apply-
ing those optimizations substantially improves the perfor-
mance. In fact, the query execution becomes less than two
orders of magnitude of the query execution time when no
protection is applied (regardless of the considered dataset
size).
4.5 Privacy Analysis
Our protocol is immune against replay attacks. That is, even
if the same composition was executed several times with
the same inputs, data service providers cannot increase their
confidence sufficiently to infer with certainty the identity of
a data subject with which they are queried. For example, as
explained when we analyzed the effect of α on the privacy
guarantee, if α was set to 20, and k was set to 5, then the
probability of a privacy breach happening is prob = 1(αk)2 =
1
10000 ; and when α = 200 and k = 5, that probability becomes
1000000. That is, the same composition needs to be executed
million times in order to have two candidate ranges (R=α∗k)
whose intersection is the identifier of a targeted data subject.
Some would argue that the order preserving encryption
scheme (OPES) of Agrawal et al. [32] is insecure and can be
broken by the mediator. However, for us, that scheme is only
a means, not an end. We can use any of the recent OPESs
reviewed in [34] or even a partial implementation of the
Homomorphic encryption [35]. Our protocol requires only
to allow the mediator to carry out equality and comparison
operations (i.e., =, <, >) which could be realized with any
of the aforementioned schemes.
One limitation of the approach is that when the domain
X of the identifiers is small, if the mediator knows all of
the values in X , then it can, after a certain number of
queries (i.e., compositions), build a mapping table between
the encrypted values and the real ones. However, this can
be overcome by encrypting the identifiers with a different
key every time a query is executed. Moreover, the proposed
generalization protocol itself can be applied on both real
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and encrypted values. In some application domains, the
mediator would be trusted, and service providers may not
need to encrypt the identifiers when they are released to
the mediator, whereas the mediator would still need to
generalize the identifiers (with our protocol) when it queries
individual services.
5 RELATED WORK
Our solution for privacy preservation relates closely to
research works in the areas of mediator based data integra-
tion, privacy-preserving data publishing and secure multi-party
computation. In this section, we review some of the most
prominent works in those areas and compare them to our
approach.
Several research works addressed the privacy issue in
the context of data service composition. For example, Yau et
al. in [16] proposed a repository to answer end-user queries
by integrating data across autonomous data sharing ser-
vices. The privacy in that work is addressed by (i) allowing
the repository to collect only the data necessary to compute
the result of a query (instead of retrieving the whole datasets
behind the services), and by (ii) hashing the identifiers (used
to link data subjects) between the services of each couple of
interconnected services in the composition graph. Unfortu-
nately, this solution does not resolve the privacy breaches
addressed in our work. In fact, the repository still has access
to intermediate and integrated data, as the hashing is carried
out by the repository itself. In addition, services can learn
information about the data held by each other, as they
are invoked with precise data values. Benslimane et al. in
[17] proposed a privacy-preserving access control model to
preserve the data privacy against data consumers. Queries
are rewritten, by a mediator, to include applicable privacy
constraints before they are resolved by service composition.
Ammar and Bertino in [36] proposed to take into account
the context of data consumers when the privacy policies
are applied on their queries before they are resolved by
service composition. Unfortunately, these solutions, while
providing good privacy protection against data consumers,
do not provide any privacy protection against un-trusted
mediators and data services.
Our data generalization protocol for service invocation
with imprecise values (e.g. ranges) is reminiscent of the
works on the Private Information Retrieval (PIR) problem
[14], [29]. The objective of these works is to execute private
queries on a remote server without letting the server to learn
anything about executed queries or their results. While cur-
rent PIR protocols could provide strong privacy guarantees
against untrusted services, they involve prohibitive compu-
tation costs (mostly due to their cryptographic nature) that
make them impractical [29] for real applications. In contrast,
our model for service invocation takes a practical stance on
the performance/information leakage trade-off; i.e. services
are allowed to learn a controlled amount of knowledge in
return for an important performance improvement.
Several research works have addressed the problem of
distributed data integration [11], [37]. Fung and Mohammed
[11] proposed a data mashup system that can anonymize
data from several data sources to provide data consumers
with datasets that satisfy the k-anonymity property. While
that work was geared towards data consumers, our focus
is on data providers and the integration system itself (i.e.
the mashup server). We assumed in our work that data
providers can freely apply their privacy policies (e.g. data
anonymization techniques) on their sides. However, our
solution can be extended with that of [11] to make the
anonymization on the integration system side. Jurczyk and
Xiong [37] proposed an algorithm to securely integrate
horizontally partitioned data from multiple data sources.
However, that work does not address the vertically parti-
tioned data which is closer to our work.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving approach
to evaluate data integration queries over autonomous data
services. Our approach allows services involved in a query
to apply their privacy policies locally. The data integration
system (i.e. the mediator) is given encrypted information
only to allow it to link data subjects across the different
services which, in turn, cannot learn information about the
data held by each other. We evaluated our approach in
the healthcare application domain, and the results showed
that our solution can be applied to cost effectively integrate
voluminous datasets. We intend to extend our approach to
improve the performance further. An interesting direction to
explore is the possibility of invoking services with chunks
of input data tuples [28]. The data value generalization al-
gorithm should then be extended then to generalize chunks
instead of single data items.
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